

EVALUATION REPORT

by Assoc. Prof. Ina Dimitrova, PhD, University of Plovdiv "Paisii Hilendarski" regarding the materials submitted for participation in the competition for the academic position of "Associate Professor" at the University of Plovdiv "Paisii Hilendarski", Field of Higher Education: 2. Humanities, Professional Field: 2.3 Philosophy (Formal and Practical Logic)

In the competition for "Associate Professor", announced in the State Gazette, issue 96 of 11 November 2025, and on the website of the University of Plovdiv "Paisii Hilendarski", for the needs of the Department of Philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy and History, the applicant is Dr. Martina Mineva.

1. General presentation of the procedure and the candidate

Within the legally established term, one candidate submitted documents for participation in the competition – Dr Martina Mineva, Chief Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy at PU. She participates in the competition with a habilitation thesis, a monograph from 2021 entitled "*Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Problematization of Philosophy*", 13 articles. The submitted documentation regarding compliance with the minimum national requirements, as well as the available supporting materials, show that all indicators are met and exceeded.

2. General characteristics of the candidate's academic activity

Martina Mineva's overall academic presence clearly stands out for its high quality, engagement with challenging topics, and precise approach to them. Her strong philosophical sensibility has undoubtedly been cultivated over the years, but it was already evident when I first had the pleasure of meeting her as a student, at a time when I was myself beginning to serve as an assistant. Since then, her academic presence has developed steadily, as expected and well deserved, with a distinctly recognizable personal profile.

The materials submitted in the present competition (which do not fully reflect all the significant work she has undertaken over the years, such as the project focused on social suffering during the period 2018–2020) unequivocally demonstrate the scope of her academic presence: authorship of original scientific research, active collaboration, participation and leading roles in research projects, participation in and organization of academic forums, editorial and co-editorial work, and administrative experience.

Her teaching activity clearly occupies a central place and by no means exhausts itself in classroom meetings with students. It also includes additional forms of communication, collaboration, and mentorship—in short, forms of engaging our younger colleagues, which are extremely important in multiple respects, both for them personally and at an institutional and substantive level. In each of these respects, Martina Mineva's work is distinguished by remarkable precision and focus.

I will briefly comment on the habilitation thesis. It offers an original and conceptually ambitious development in the field of non-classical dialectical logic, focused on the analysis of non-deductive inferences in innovative and revolutionary practices. Abduction, induction, abductive induction, and transduction are examined as processes of non-classically conceived a priori synthesis—an effort to preserve the possibility of logical analysis of non-pre-given, ecstatic, dynamically open processes, in the author’s terms. The study is characterized by a high degree of philosophical reflexivity, conceptual consistency, and notable precision.

In short, the first part focuses on the way in which Charles Peirce thematizes abduction as an autonomous form of innovative inference, as well as on Hanson’s attempts to legitimize it in logical terms. The concept of “transduction” is also examined as a specific form of inference in the context of revolutionary practices. In the second part, the focus shifts to practical logic and the challenges that arise in analyzing innovative practices, with emphasis on the functions of non-classically conceived a priori syntheses (136 p.). In the third part, through a concrete case study, an experimental analysis is conducted of Kepler’s discovery of the elliptical orbit of Mars, demonstrating how non-deductive inferences function in practice. The emphasis is on the “theoretical sweep” in the transition from concrete observation to the formulation of the laws of planetary motion.

I agree with the stated contributions and would once again like to emphasize the impressive consistency—yet with continuously deepening levels of problematization, reflexivity, precision, and discovery in the field of practical logic—within Martina Mineva’s research trajectory, of which this study is exemplary evidence.

3. Critical remarks and recommendations

The brief comments and questions under this point are not intended to be understood as “critical” or as “recommendations”, but I retain the formal heading in order to comply with the institutional canon of PU.

Martina Mineva’s research is clearly situated within a particular *Denkkollektiv* with its own *Denkstil*. I will not conceal that, with respect to it, I am a “foreigner” in Schutz’s sense. I do not say this with any critical undertone—on the contrary, I consider such a style of work to be natural and productive, and in our context perhaps even a rare example of a community capable of thinking so effectively together. I mention it only to situate my questions from an external position—that of the “foreigner” who inevitably orients herself somewhat tentatively, seeking points of encounter between her own and the other style of thought and testing whether some of her own self-evidences can be preserved within the new framework.

The first cluster of questions concerns the key concept of “groundbreakings” The initial outline of its meaning appears on p. 17: by “groundbreakings” the author does not mean merely “innovations” in the narrow sense, but interprets them more broadly as connected to practices

in which events of the emergence of new ideas through abduction, the expansion of a given pattern through induction, and transductive practices relating to the revolutionizing of paradigms occur. A footnote on the same page adds that non-deductive inferences lead us to points of rupture, anomalies, contradictions in experience that shake the sense of continuity and stability—moments of crisis from which new theory emerges.

It seems to me that there is a certain circularity in this leading definition. Taking abduction as an example: it is said to produce new ideas; yet when we ask what counts as a “new idea” in science, the answer appears to be: that which occurs through abduction. A similar circularity appears in a definition on p. 246: abduction gives a new idea; a new idea is what is born through abduction.

What is clear is that groundbreakings are sought at points of rupture that unsettle “normal science.” But can this Kuhnian scheme be generalized to everything we call novelty, discovery, or revolution in science? Or does it apply only to certain episodes? Lakatos, for instance, criticizes Kuhn for dramatizing scientific practice and argues that change occurs more gradually.

If we move beyond theoretical reflections on science, which specific events count as groundbreakings in Mineva’s sense? Scientific developments occur in different ways: some are immediately recognized, others remain latent, postponed, or even rejected (Mendel’s discovery, continental drift, Semmelweis’s findings, etc.). Is the proposed analytical framework applicable to contemporary science, often described as accelerating and hyper-convergent, emerging within vast networks of human and non-human actants, including AI?

The second cluster of questions concerns abduction outside this particular *Denkkollektiv*. In mainstream philosophy of science, abduction is often linked to inference to the best explanation, everyday reasoning, and clinical diagnosis. Since the habilitation thesis does not explicitly engage with this trajectory, I wonder whether and how the proposed analysis functions in such everyday contexts. If abduction leads to new ideas regardless of context, can we speak of “micro- groundbreakings”? Or are there vast numbers of abductive inferences that do not produce groundbreakings - and if so, what do they produce? The circularity mentioned above may need to be addressed.

Finally, regarding the experimental analysis of Kepler’s “struggle with Mars”: does the historical distance not eliminate countless elements of the original network of actants within which Kepler thought? Are we analyzing a reconstructed narrative rather than an actual practical situation?

Conclusion

Dr Martina Mineva fulfills all legal and university requirements for the academic position of Associate Professor in Professional Field 2.3 Philosophy (Formal and Practical Logic).

On the basis of her overall professional presence as a researcher and teacher, and the quality of her scholarly publications, I confidently recommend that she be awarded the academic title of "Associate Professor."

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Prepared by:

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