

ANNOTATIONS OF THE MATERIALS

submitted by

Chief Assistant Professor Martina Stoilova Mineva-Nikolova, PhD

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2.3. Philosophy (Formal and practical logic)

1.1. ¹Mineva, M. 2025. *Groundbreakings. Abduction, induction, transduction in the logic of practice*. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, ISBN 978-619-01-1713-1.

The word “groundbreakings” in the title represents a multilayered theoretical problem explored in this monograph: non-deductive inferences in groundbreaking practices. Through a critical examination of the issues of formal and practical logic, the text offers a multidimensional logical analysis of abduction and induction in science, while also problematizing the inferential status of transduction. This is achieved from the perspective of the practical logic of the dialectical (both endogenous and exogenous), and therewith through the methods of non-classical transcendental logic, which provide opportunities for analysis when those of formal logic prove insufficient. The work follows Charles Peirce’s conviction that „each chief step in science has been a lesson in logic“ and maintains a primary focus on abduction, which he defines as „the only logical operation which introduces any new idea“. The analysis starts from the framework within which Peirce examines the problems of non-deductive inferences in his pragmatism – with critical sensitivity both to the limitations of strict formal-logical approaches and to those that Hanson defines as dealing with the “logic of the finished research report”. Unlike the views of critics of the logic of scientific discovery, who reduce the genesis of ideas in one way or another to psychologism, the problem in this study is maintained as fundamentally logical. This is in unison with Peirce’s insistence that the problem of the emergence of new ideas always remains fundamentally logical, regardless of its historical, sociological, or psychological dimensions, as “all the psychology in the world will leave the logical problem just where it was”. Stepping beyond the boundaries of pragmatism, however, proves necessary, as its approaches remain vulnerable to charges of psychologism or are limited by problematic interpretative moves - that diminish the chances for a multidimensional logical analysis. By turning to the theory of practical logic and analyses that uphold the endogeneity of non-deductive inferences, the monograph offers a solution where the aforementioned frameworks prove insufficient. This outlines the methodological backbone of the study, which involves not only an exit from Peircean pragmatism but also a *shift in focus* toward the research problems of *non-classical transcendental logic* as a problematic which is presently under development in the Sector of Philosophical logic at Paisii Hilendarski University of Plovdiv and at the Institute for Critical Theories of Supermodernity through the problematization of the inheritance of a number of authors to whom the text itself also turns. The central question guiding the monograph in this sense is: *how are non-deductive inferences actually possible in groundbreaking practices?* This is a question that differs distinctly, on the one hand, from the classical Kantian formulation of the problem in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which asks “how are” “synthetic judgments *a priori*” or “synthetic *a priori* propositions” possible, by

¹ The numbering of the publications in this document corresponds to that in document 06. *List of scientific works* by Ch. Assist. Prof. Martina Stoilova Mineva-Nikolova, PhD, section *Publications for participation in the competition for the academic position of “Associate professor”*.

emphasizing not the products (“judgments” or “propositions”) but the practical realization of the inferences themselves – precisely as processes. On the other hand, the question thus posed also differs from Deyanov’s non-classical interpretation, in which the emphasis is on “logical propositions conceived as *a priori* syntheses”, i.e., on propositions as products of inferring rather than on the processes of inferring themselves. In contrast, the monograph focuses on the *practices of non-deductive inferring as involving multidimensional a priori synthesizing, i.e., on the processes of endogenous practical-logical inferring*. It is established that this allows for the problematization of the features of a non-Kantian transcendental schematizing. The monograph arrives at a multidimensional analysis of the practical-logical issues concerning the “greatest piece” of abduction ever performed according to Peirce: Johannes Kepler’s discovery of the elliptical orbit of Mars. It brings into focus the theoretical problem developed in the study regarding the logic of the genesis and unfolding of Kepler’s *theoretical momentum* – the transition from the discovery of the elliptical Martian orbit to the formulation of the revolutionary laws of planetary motion.

In *Instead of an introduction*, the research strategy is presented, which is based on “thinking through” one thinker against another or against themselves, occasionally provoking critical dialogues that never took place, but which are possible. This leads to the formation of the analytical metalanguage used for the multidimensional thematization of non-deductive inferences in groundbreaking practices. The conceptual background is presented in three narrative clusters – interpretative cores that intertwine and often remain implicit within the study itself. The first problematizes the logic of scientific discovery in light of abduction by turning to fragments from the works of Kuhn, Lakatos, Kisiel, and Hanson, and returning to Peirce to distinguish the boundaries between productive and unproductive approaches to non-deductive inferences from a practical-logical perspective. The second concerns the praxeological turn in logic of 20th-century, shifting interest toward the logic of practice itself (Coulter’s “endogenous logic of practice”). This cluster pays attention both to its initiators, such as Bourdieu, and its intellectual ancestor, such as Wittgenstein and Heidegger. The third cluster is related to the focus on problems of the non-classical interpretation of transcendental methods – an approach characteristic of the non-classical logic of the dialectical and inspired by Mamardashvili’s understanding of the difference between „classical“ and „non-classical“. In the monograph, this primarily refers to the critical problematization of Kantian, Husserlian, Heideggerian, and Cassirerian ideas relevant to the issues discussed in the text.

In *Part one*, there is a critical discussion of both the ways in which Peirce first thematized abduction as an autonomous form of innovative inference and the attempts to legitimize it by Hanson. The primary task is to problematize the limits of thinkability of the logical within their theorizations, as well as in Bibler’s theory of transduction, in order to highlight certain methodological problems in their analyses. This leads to the drawing of new demarcation lines between abduction, induction, and what Peirce thematizes as “abductory induction”. The hypothesis is tested that these three forms of inference relate to the renewal of a given paradigm through expansion, which begins with *an anomaly thought of as a pre-predicative contradiction*. In abductive inferring, an expansion of the boundaries of the paradigm is established, whereas in inductive and abductory-inductive inferring, the expansion occurs *within* the boundaries of the paradigm. In this context, three types of *quanta* are distinguished – functioning as such are the pre-predicative evidences newly synthesized through non-deductive inferring. The key concept of the *abductive quantum* is introduced to denote a unit of new quality in a newly inferred exemplar, which indefinitely opens the exemplar itself for following through analogizing in inductive inferring, i.e., for quantitative expansions. On the other hand, it is shown that inductive and abductory-inductive inferring expand a given paradigm *within* its boundaries by adding *inductive* (quantitative) or *abductory-inductive* (qualitative-quantitative) *quanta*. The findings in this part also show that transduction

is not an autonomous logical inference but a characteristic of revolutionary practices involving non-deductive inferences, triggered by a synthesis of a cluster of anomalies. Through the problematization of the unresolved question regarding the functions of imagination in abduction in Peirce, the necessity emerges to expand logical analysis beyond the framework of pragmatism. This, in turn, leads to testing the analytical potential of the practical logic of the dialectical for examining the functions of a non-classical conception of transcendental schematizing in non-deductive inferences.

In *Part two*, the main methodological problems in the analysis of non-deductive inferences are examined within the context of practical logic. Through a critical dialogue with the problem of the legacy of Kantian transcendentalism (discussed via the 1929 Davos debate between Heidegger and Cassirer), the study develops concepts such as the *will to form*, and *therewith the isomorphy between sensibility and understanding*, which is proposed as an *unpredetermined heir to Kant's productive power of imagination*. The concept of the *abductive quantum* is further developed, being linked to the problem of the *theoretical momentum*, as well as to those of the *promise of objectification* and *unpredetermined possibilities*. In connection with the problem of the *exogenous* functioning of the logic of practice, an addition to the concept of the *transcendental Third* (e.g., *homo astronomicus*) is proposed, emphasizing that its synthesis, as a condition for transcendental *intersubjectivity*, also establishes the possibility for *homomorphy* – a structural similarity in the way that thought forms, arising from different intentional trajectories and without a predetermined *ego*-form, can prove to be valid and intelligible for multiple transcendental subjects. From this, it is shown that the universal validity and objectivity of the inferred forms are not due to their initial formal-logical universality, but rather to the possibility of *homomorphy* as a practical-logical achievement. This is conceivable as a key condition for the possibility of transcendental *intersubjectivity*. The study also establishes that *the time intervals* associated with non-deductive inferences have legitimizing functions for the validation of discoveries from the *intrasubjective* to the *intersubjective* level, as *intrasubjective* validation occurs as an event, at *the moment of a priori* synthesizing – *a moment* in the Heideggerian sense, yet conceived through Sabeva's interpretation as a „long authentic present“. In this second part, an experimental *demarkation line is also drawn between the forms of enthymematic analogizing* in abductive, inductive, and abductory-inductive inferring through an analysis of the relationship between *the ego* and *the cogitatum* (the exemplar). The results show: in abductive inferring an exemplar from another paradigm is followed; in inductive inferring – from the same paradigm; and in abductory-inductive inferring – in the course of traditionalization, a new exemplar synthesized through abduction is followed. This part also includes an analysis of logical problems regarding non-deductive inferences, traced along the intentional trajectories of groundbreaking: the assault by anomalies and the transition from anomaly to *a priori* synthesis. Emphasis is placed on privation and contradiction, as well as on the functions of the operators *eo ipso* (for retaining the multidimensional unity of the process of inferring) and on the functions of *essentially* (as a marker of pre-predicative affirmation and naming).

In *Part three*, the concepts examined and developed in the previous parts are applied to analyze Kepler's discovery of the elliptical orbit of Mars, tracing the logic of the genesis and unfolding of his *theoretical momentum* – the transition from the specific discovery to the formulation of the revolutionary laws of planetary motion. Special attention is paid to a *cluster of logical transformations* (new practically true idealizations), which is linked to the redefining of the concept of the planet as a physical body and participates in *the theoretical momentum*. The work demonstrates that *the abductive inferring* of the elliptical orbit of Mars (in combination with the cluster of logical transformations) is not isolated but participates in a *transductive practice* that strengthens the Copernican revolution in a way not predetermined by the revolution itself. Thus, it turns out that logically in the transition from *all planets have*

circular orbits to all planets have elliptical orbits – as analytical propositions in which differences between the two paradigms are explicated – the new “all” is not a logical consequence of the old one, but the result of a *transductive practice involving abductive, abductory-inductive, and inductive inferences*.

The monograph proves that the logical issues of *practical non-deductive inferences* are key to understanding groundbreaking. It is emphasized that with the necessary modifications and by analogy, the analytical approach proposed in the text could also be relevant in studies of logical inferences in groundbreaking practices in other fields such as economics or technology. The book includes an *Appendix* with a brief background and the main tenets of the non-classical logic of the dialectical. Its aim is to provide at least a general compensation for the limitation of the study related to the specific theoretical effect of engaging with this logic: the focus on practical logic leaves its other dimension – the exogenous theoretical logic – implicit.

1.2. Mineva, M. 2021. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: the problematization of philosophy. (Praxeological turn, limits, legitimation)*. pr. Iztok-Zapad, Sofia: Heterodoxia, pp. 240; ISBN 978-619-920-4009.

The monograph is focused on the praxeological turn in logic (from problems of formal logic to those of practical logic of ordinary language), mainly in the analytic tradition of the 20th century, traced predominantly through the works of Wittgenstein. The research strategy engages Wittgenstein's ideas in dialogue with analytic authors (Strawson, Austin) and other authors who are more or less distant from the analytic tradition (such as ethnomethodologists like Garfinkel, Sacks, Coulter, or others like Bourdieu or Lyotard), but all possessing what Coulter calls a ‘post-Wittgensteinian sensibility’ toward the problems of ‘the rough ground’ (of practice). The book consists of two parts.

In *the first part* of the book, the critique of traditional philosophy by Wittgenstein is analyzed. A central problem of logic in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is the opposition between „said“ and „shown“. In the context of the picture theory of language, the logical form is only shown and cannot be said, which renders philosophical propositions senseless (*unsinnig*). The failure of representatives of the logical positivism (Carnap) to overcome philosophical silence through the ‘formal ways of speaking’ is critically analyzed. The return to the necessity of logical experience is traced – from its denial in the *Tractatus* (1921) (in polemic with Russell, for whom it is acquaintance with logical objects such as logical form – a key problem of philosophical logic), through the necessity of aposteriority in analysis in *Some remarks on logical form* (1929) to grammatical observation in *Philosophical investigations* (1953) (as a conceptual heir to logical experience). Emphasis is placed on the changed status of the logical problematic in the later work: it does not disappear, but is embodied in the practices of language and requires a new palette of analytical methods.

In *the second part*, the semantic core of the text is developed – the thesis that *language games are not all of equal standing*, derived from the analysis of naming as a performative act (in thinking through Austin versus Wittgenstein), which allows it to be a move in a language game and delineates a class of games that set possibilities for the name’s participation in other games – *language games of naming*. The turn to the logic of ordinary language by authors like Strawson is also examined, who very clearly introduces a key division between two types of logic: formal logic vs. logic of ordinary language. This line of meaning directs the study towards practical logic, thematized by Bourdieu through his theory of discrepancy between theory and practice, which grounds a practical sense of correctness as a generative principle of practices, as well as ethnomethodologists (Garfinkel, Sacks, Coulter), who in turn analyze problems of endogenous logics of practices, among which is that of indexical expressions. The primary

conclusion is that in the course of this turn, the problems of logic, although not strictly formal-logical, do not disappear, but, conceived as incorporated in language practices, turn out to require a multidimensional praxeological analysis. This leads to the key contribution of the study – *an analytics of language games of legitimation* within the field of practical logic. Lyotard is also a key figure for this grounding because he – interpreting language games as a method for discussing the legitimational functions of metanarratives and the process of their delegitimation – suggests the connection between language games and their legitimating functions regarding the limits of the logical and philosophy. A working classification of *language games of legitimation* is also proposed. Thus, the theoretical field of the praxeological turn in logic, where the discussion of the problematic of *language games of legitimation* proves possible, also leads to the necessity of rethinking the methodological perspectives and challenges facing philosophy, and with this, facing logic today.

2.1. Mineva, M. 2025. Abduction vs. abductory induction: from demarcation to relation. In: *Critique and humanism*, 63(2), 95–110, ISSN 0861-1718.

The paper explores the issues of the demarcation and the relation between the non-deductive inferences examined by Charles Peirce: abduction and abductory (or qualitative) induction. The first two sections trace their common problematizations, presented in his works from different periods, highlighting questions that arise from the introduction of the concept of abductory induction. Against this background, the third section focuses on the problem Peirce implicitly suggests but does not explicitly formulate: how we can conceptualize the relation between abduction and abductory induction. An experimental analysis of Peirce’s example of abductory induction is conducted by focusing on the form of analogy, which he associates with Aristotle’s concept of *παράδειγμα* and conceives as combining characteristics of both abduction and induction. The paper argues that in cases of non-scientific practices, a relation of projection emerges between them – one that involves not guesses, as Peirce suggests, but abductive quanta, linked to the emergence of new possibilities, grounded in analogy and the practical testing of hypotheses. In doing so, the logical relation between the forms of inference is not merely shown, but also the problem of abductory induction is brought into sharper focus.

2.2. Mineva, M. 2025. Persistence of everyday categorizations against renewal through induction. In: *Καιρός*, 7, 6–23; ISSN 2534-8442.

The paper offers a practicological analysis of the induction, related to rethinking, concretization, personalization, and the proposal of new life trajectories as a counterpoint to the problem of everyday quantification through “all”, “everyone”, “no one”, “always”, viewed as a legitimation strategy for upholding categorical boundaries. It is argued that these quantifications often function analogously to Sacks’s *anti-modier modifiers*, which legitimate practicological boundaries of categorical, and thereby social, immutability. Based on a conceptual connecting of Harvey Sacks’ concept of “protection against induction” and Lyotard’s interpretation of legitimation within language games as a method (a problematic inspired by late Wittgenstein), the argument is made that in a number of utterances logically stabilized categories can be identified, which, as stable categorizations, are linked to legitimating strategies that block the potential for a practicological inductive refutation, and, consequently, for the renewal of experience. Based on an analysis of interview fragments conducted within the project “Future trapped in the carbon past” (DUECOS, Plovdiv University), a typology of strategies is proposed: some oriented toward maintaining the logical persistence of categorical explanations, and others – toward practical inductions referring to the

so-called „deparalyzing possibilities“ which are conceived as moves in language games through which a potential for biographical transformation and the unfolding of alternative legitimation regimes are activated.

2.3. Mineva, M. 2025. From hard-won success to traditionalisation: Kepler's war with Mars. In: *Heterodoxia*, 3–4; ISSN 2738-7569, (in print).

The text offers a continuation of an experimental analysis of the discovery of the shape of the orbit of Mars by Johannes Kepler, which is published in issue 1–2/2020 of the *Heterodoxia* journal. Here, however, it is not conceived merely as the most emblematic example of an abductive inference, as Charles Peirce points out (nor as a “hard-won success” as it would be called in the socioanalysis of self-inheritance), nor is the focus solely on the *a priori* synthesis in the inference, conceived non-classically through the question: how the discovery actually turns out to be possible? This study problematizes in depth a question that had previously been only suggested. It is crucial for the analysis of similar cases of innovative practices and reads as follows: how *the theoretical momentum* that Kepler managed to achieve his success with Mars actually turns out to be possible, to move on to formulating through it the revolutionary laws of planetary motion. It emphasizes the logical dimensions in the traditionalization of the discovery, including the following main problems: *the forbidden obligatory* and the related to it pre-predicative evidences, of the relation between *quantum* and *quantifier*, and above all that without which it would not be possible to understand theoretically the depth of the problem for Kepler's *theoretical momentum* – the extension of the Copernican revolution through the dialectic of innovative inferences such as abduction and induction, while also raising the question of the status of transduction.

2.4. Mineva, M. 2025. Norwood Hanson and the problem of abduction after Charles Peirce. In: Mitrev, G., Antonov, S., Zlatkova, M. (eds.) 2025. *The humanities and social knowledge: narratives and horizons*. Plovdiv: Paisii Hilendarski University Press (in print).

The purpose of the text is, after a brief presentation of the main criticisms of abduction, to present arguments supporting the thesis that, due to the absence of a theory of practical logic, Norwood Hanson – despite being among the most prominent advocates of abduction as the logic of scientific discovery and despite his writings clearly reflecting this – does not provide a convincing defense or explication of it. Against this background, a return to the advantages in Peirce's conception of abductive inference as a logic of discovery is made. All this, at the end of the text, leads to outlining the general strategy, which is implied in a multidimensional logical analysis of abduction in innovative practices. It includes also an explicit or implicit focus on those thinkers who inspired the praxeological turn in logic during the 20th century (from Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Austin, etc. – to Bourdieu and the ethnomethodologists).

2.5. Mineva, M. 2024. The Janus-faced abductive inference. In: *Καιρός*, 6, 64–78; ISSN 2534-8442.

The text offers an analysis of the problem of the abductive inference's internal limits, attempting to extract the theoretical charge of the metaphor about Janus-faced abduction, offered by John Kaag. This problem is put into consideration through Charles Peirce's dual definition of abduction simultaneously as both a process of forming explanatory hypotheses and the only logical operation that presents new ideas. It is emphasized that: by going through 1) taking into account the praxeological turn in logic (20th century); 2) making sense of an analogous metaphor in Ernest Cassirer, which refers to symbolic forms; and 3) turning to an

attempt to analyze Kepler's discovery of the shape of the orbit of Mars as the most emblematic example of abductive inference (as Peirce points out), it is possible to think the theoretical charge of the metaphor of the Janus-faced abduction. The results of the investigation are presented summarized with the highlighting of the following problems: 1) the modal conflict of *the forbidden obligatory*; 2) *the weak incommensurability*; and 3) the dynamics between *forma formans* and *forma formata*.

2.6. Mineva, M. 2023. The problem of abductive inference: between the magic and the disenchantment. In: *Sociological problems, special issue (LV)*, 246–261, ISSN 0324-1572.

The paper offers a practicological analysis of subjectness in abductive inference, viewed through the prism of the metamorphoses of “magic” and “disenchantment” in the case of innovative labor in the context of the theory of structures of self-mediation. The primary objective is to investigate how, in abduction, through the self-formation of an 'ego with unpredetermined subjectness,' the genesis of the new is rendered possible; how the resolution of contradictions in science may therewith (*eo ipso*) prove to be a resolution of contradictions in economics, and how this is conceivable logically through the analysis of abductive quanta (in science) in P-U within P-U-S ∞ (with the logical form $S^{\wedge}P^{\wedge}U^{\wedge}\infty$), proving crucial for the analysis of the possibility of surplus value production in the economy. The experimental analysis focuses on the abduction in the case of Thomas Edison and the invention of the electric lamp. The research traces the trajectory of the “thing” – from its creation as an “enchanted thing” in the laboratory to its legitimation as „a magical“, i.e. “promising thing” capable of operating within the economic structure. The analysis unfolds within the dimensions of the non-classical logic of the dialectical: practical logic (both endogenous and exogenous) and exogenous theoretical logic. The study reaches the conclusion that the condition of possibility for the inductive expansion by quanta (in the quantitatively expanding structure of the economy) is established through the deindexicalization (not without remainder) of abductive quanta (from measure-giving structures). This deindexicalization is carried out through practicological strategies of legitimation through traditionalization (syllogistically, through quality-maintaining structures). This emphasizes that abductive inference is the key condition for the mutual mediation between different structures of self-mediation.

2.7. Mineva, M. 2023. From “Capital” as a chance before the logics of the dialectical toward the problem of subjectness in the abductive inference. In: *Sociological problems, special issue (LV)*, 64–84, ISSN 0324-1572.

The paper aims to achieve a summarized representation of the problem of subjectness as a problem concerning the return of its functions in history above all in the case of abductive inference as one of the non-deductive forms of inference in the *endogenous* practical logics of the dialectical. Since the latter can hardly be thought effectively in the theory of structures of self-mediation without considering the *exogenous* non-classical logic of the dialectical, the text proceeds from the more general problem of the conditions for the possibility of introducing the exogenous logic – the successful content formalization of Marx’s syllogistics. That is why the first paragraphs of the text are based on a critical examination of the productivity of two of the formalizations of Marx’s syllogistic, which follow his *Capital* – David Harvey’s, on one hand, and Deyan Deyanov’s, on the other. This gives a chance, in the next paragraphs of the paper, to show clearly the reasons why the second content formalization is essential in the constitution of the nonclassical logic of the dialectical. This logic’s main characteristics are presented in the third and fourth paragraphs as a necessary condition for understanding the problem of subjectness in abductive inference as an element of the practical logic not only in the cases of

scientific discoveries, but also in a wider sense, as a logic in cases of technological inventions and economic innovations (or generally in innovative labor). Precisely with this background in mind and in contrast to the critical consideration of other analysis of subjectness, such as Georg Lukacs's and Louis Althusser's, inspired by Marx's revolutionary form of science, the final part of the paper outlines some important specifics about the theoretical approach to the problem of subjectness (in abductive reasoning in particular) in the theory of structures of self-mediation.

2.8. Mineva, M. 2021. The Sense of rightness through analogy. In: Georgiev, D., Nencheva, D. 2021. *Etudes in experimental humanities*. Sofia: Scribens, 66–86; ISBN 978-619-7467-19-2.

The text raises experimentally the problem of analogy and its role in the formation of a practical sense of correctness. The problem is thought in the context of the praxeological turn in logic – as a problem in the field of endogenous practical logics. Holding the problem of analogies, the text starts from the critical problematization of the so-called *sense of rightness* in Pierre Bourdieu's works, emphasizing his debt to Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas, repeatedly acknowledged by Bourdieu himself. The text not only highlights the connections between the problem of the *sense of rightness* and Wittgenstein's *paradox in following a rule* from the period of his "Philosophical Investigations", but on this background more clearly emphasizes some of the key preconditions, which are necessary for the establishment of the problem of *how the practical sense of rightness is actually possible through analogy*. The nonclassical functions of introspection are distinguished in analyses of analogy, and it is thought as an important condition for the formation of a sense of rightness in practice, which may or may not lead to *a priori* syntheses.

2.9. Mineva, M. 2020. Renewing inferences and practical logical problematization of socioanalytical symptoms. In: *Heterodoxia*, 1–2, 157–185; ISSN 2738-7569.

The text offers an experimental logical analysis of Kepler's discovery of the elliptical orbit of Mars, interpreted as an emblematic example of abductive inference, but also as a case study of what is termed in the socioanalysis of self-inheritance as "hard-won success" in which socioanalytical symptoms could also be problematized. The study is based on the hypothesis that the identification of a range of logical data (through the prism of non-classical transcendental logic) in cases of renewing inferences is key to recognizing various socio-analytical data within socioanalytical symptomatology. Accordingly, *the first* paragraph presents brief critical notes on the most essential methodological landmarks necessary for understanding the functioning and analysis of logical data as socioanalytical in the subsequent sections. These are related to negation as privation, the functions of contradiction, and sensory (and perhaps supersensory) affection in renewing inferences involving *a priori* syntheses, as well as the functions of anomalies within them. *The second* paragraph proceeds from the problem of the relationship between intentional and factual history, presenting data from factual history directly related to Kepler's discovery against this background. In *the third* paragraph, by tracing back the paths of the processes of inferring involving *a priori* syntheses, privations, contradictions, and anomalies, the analysis shifts to this case with a focus on Kepler's intentional history and the problem of how the discovery actually became possible as a renewing inference.

2.10. Mineva, M. 2019. A priori syntheses and abductive inference. In: *Καιρός*, 4, 16–32, ISSN 2534-8442.

The aim of the text is to present an interpretation of the abductive inference as one of the ways by which Russell's notion of logical experience can function (in a praxeological perspective), and can be treated as *a priori* synthesis (in nonclassical sense). The paper critically problematizes the abduction in Peirce's and Hanson's works, with the purpose of showing the way in which it is a problem, whose solutions can be searched in the light of nonclassical transcendental logic. Emphasizing the multidimensional nature of the problem from such a perspective, the following questions are critically observed: 1) how abductive inference is possible as an *a priori* synthesis, i.e. what are the specifics of the logical experience, which participate in abductive inference?; 2) How this experience differs from that involved in inductive inferences?; 3) How the presented problem can be thought and being considered in the light of nonclassical transcendentalism? To mark some possibilities for answer to the last question the following strategy is undertaken: first from the Russell's notion of logical experience as a focus of the philosophical logic, the analysis passes to a problem of *a priori* synthesizing and reaches the problem of mimesis (i.e. it is investigated how it is possible the problems of abductive inference and of the logical experience to be linked). The last section concerns the attempts to identify a general logical form of abductive inference .

2.11. Mineva, M., Tasheva, M., Petkov, T. 2019. Socioanalytical protocol project: guidelines and practical applications. B: Tasheva, M., Petkov, T. (and others) 2019. *Social Vulnerability: Socio-Analytical Perspectives*. Plovdiv: Paisii Hilendarski University Press, 36–62, ISBN 978-619-202-532-8.

The study presents the development of a socioanalytical protocol, functioning as a primary methodological tool for the identification and analysis of formal structures of practical actions in empirical cases of social vulnerability, which are of interest to the socioanalysis of selfinheritance. *The first part* of the text critically examines the criteria for the reliability of the toolkit, justifying the necessity of methodological reflexivity in the application of the methods of practical logic – specifically, in the identification of endogenous logical data conceived as indicators of socioanalytical data within socioanalytical conversations. *The second part* is dedicated to the methodological demarcation of the research from psychoanalysis and psychiatry. *The third part* of the text (written by the candidate) focuses on clarifying the elements of the protocol, where the leading role is played by the identification and analysis of practicological data functioning as data relevant to socioanalysis: practicological inferences, everyday quantifications, analytics of indexicals, analytics of modalities, naming, etc.. The publication concludes with appendix tables developed as components of the socioanalytical protocol, intended to be completed during the practical application of the protocol.

3.1. Mineva, M. 2019. The Problem of Legitimation in the analysis of cases of social vulnerability. *Καιρός*, 4, 124–133; ISSN 2534-8442.

The article examines the functioning of everyday quantifications (through the use of words such as “every,” “all,” “no one,” “none,” “some,” etc.) as an essential aspect of various practical strategies for legitimation of boundaries of language games, with an emphasis on their *persistence*, while also tracing their psychopathological effects as conceived within the field of socioanalysis. From a practicological perspective, the *persistence* by legitimation can be analyzed by paying attention to the way quantifications participate in the formation of pre-predicative evidences of thought. These evidences are also linked to the problem of “protection against induction” discussed in Harvey Sacks' theory of conversation analysis. Thus, it is

concluded that fixing the stability of categorizations as such evidences can be understood as a legitimation strategy containing an implicit or explicit layer of quantifications, which requires effective methods of analysis, especially in cases of social vulnerability.

3.2. Mineva, M. 2018. Epistemology of logic and the problem of logical experience. In: *Kairos*, 3, 137–145; ISSN 2534-8442.

The article aims to outline the perspective of Ludwig Wittgenstein's text “Some Remarks on Logical Form” (1929) by questioning the notion of logical experience and to show that where Wittgenstein discusses logical problems related to experience, the problems in fact belong to the epistemology of logic. It is emphasized that in 1929 there is an unpredictability of logical forms, and along with that there is a return to the notion of logical experience, which is denied in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Against this background, it is shown that in *Philosophical Investigations*, with the notion of grammatical observation as analogous to the notion of logical experience, the problem of unpredictability of logical forms extends into a problem of the unprejudiceness of different logics of language games. The main conclusion of the text is that in the *Tractatus* it is impossible to speak of the epistemology of logic due to the denial of logical experience, but it is possible in 1929, through the introduction of aposteriority in the analysis of phenomena, as it is also possible in *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), but under the assumption that Wittgenstein is considered as an intellectual ancestor of the praxeological turn in logic.

Prepared by:

(Chief Assistant Professor Martina Stoilova Mineva-Nikolova, PhD)