

REVIEW

by Assoc. Prof. Valeriy Radoslavov Perlikov
of the materials submitted for participation in the competition
for the academic position of **Associate Professor**
at Plovdiv University "Paisii Hilendarski"

field of higher education 8. Arts.

Professional field 8.4. Theatre and Film Art, scientific specialty "Theatre Studies and Theatre Art" in "Acting for Drama Theatre".

In the competition for "Associate Professor", announced in the State Gazette, issue 39 of 02.05.2023 and on the website of Plovdiv University "Paisii Hilendarski" for the needs of the Department of Aesthetic Education at the Faculty of Education, as candidate(s) participated Dr. Krasimira Tsvetanova Ivanova from NATFA "Kr. Sarafov" and Dr. Petar Zapryanov Odadzhiev.

By Order No. RD-21-1417 of 30.06.2023, as amended by Order No. RD-21-1470 of 12.07.2023 of the Rector of Plovdiv University "Paisii Hilendarski" (PU) I have been appointed as a member of the scientific jury of the competition for the academic position of "**Associate Professor**" at PU in the field of higher education 8. Arts, professional field 8.4. Theatre and Film Art, scientific specialty "Theatre Studies and Theatre Art" ("Acting for Drama Theatre"), **announced for the needs of** the Department of Aesthetic Education at the Faculty of Education.

The following candidates have applied for the competition:

Dr. Krasimira Tsvetanova Ivanova from NATFA "Kr. Sarafov" and Dr. Petar Zapryanov Odadzhiev.

1. The set of materials presented by Dr. Petar Zapryanov Odadzhiev is in accordance with the Regulations for the Development of the Academic Staff of PU.

The main emphasis of the materials provided by Dr. P. Odadzhiev's materials for the competition is the monograph "**Physical Action in Psychological and Metaphysical Theatre (The Laboratories of K. S. Stanislavski and J. Grotowski. Pedagogical Aspects)**". Dr. Odadzhiev organized his presentation in the following parameters (the following is an excerpt from the text with an indication of the page from which it is quoted):

"...The object of the study is the evolutionary processes in the formation of the methodology of C.S. Stanislavsky and J. Grotowski - as fundamental for the work with the actor in psychological and metaphysical theatre.

The subject of the research is the laboratory-pedagogical problems accompanying the mastering of "physical action" reflected in the original theoretical sources authored by Stanislavsky and Grotowski.

The main aim of the present study is the reflexive critical presentation of Stanislavsky's Method of Physical Action and its continuation in Grotowski's search. Their unification - as primordially related, based on the fact that they both created methods of organic dramatic presence that relied on the laboratory-trained psychophysical capacities of the actor, and on the hypothesis that they are crucial for both different kinds of theatre - the psychological (with its being) and the metaphysical (with its over-being)" (pp. 13-14).

The author concludes his exposition with the following conclusions (pp. 268-271):

- Both Konstantin Sergeyevich Stanislavsky and Jerzy Grotowski created methods of *organic* acting presence based on the psychophysical capacities of the performer. The organicity of the actor, thought of by Stanislavski, is related to the direct physiological changes in the actor - as a result of the imagination. The organicity of the performer/actor for Grotowski, is a feature of *the biological line* /.../ which the actor consciously builds in the process of individual work and which becomes the basis for a living presence in the artificially created score of the spectacle/performance.

- For both, fundamental is the understanding of the need to activate *subconscious processes* for working on stage that are *consciously* managed.

- The basis of physical action theory for both is rooted in the presence of *impulse*. Stanislavski finds that physical action is based on subconscious reactions rather than rational ones and is the product of inner impulses. /.../ This is the point from which Grotowski's interest in Stanislavski began, and whose theory (of impulse and physical action) he developed.

- The impulse in Stanislavsky ("action poses" as he sometimes called them) is rooted in the individual nature of the artist, in his body, and if it is held (not expressed outwardly in an unfolded physical action), it is reflected in the periphery of the body (eyes and facial expressions). It appears as a reaction to his imagination, in relation to the circumstances of the dramaturgy. All physical action is used in the psychological spectacle (containing situations of everyday life.) Impulses in Grotowski are "morphemes of the game" /.../ Practically, it was developed in the Poor Theatre period and was deepened in the Art as a Means of Transport, where it is already rooted in the "pre-body" - as a union of the nature of the performer with the "pre-structure", which is "something objective and independent of time and place". For Grotowski, the role of impulses becomes dominant as the performer lives in extra-daily situations.

- Both Stanislavsky and Grotowski, have analogous paths (in the sense of a complex evolution) to their main discovery: for Stanislavsky, it is the Method of Physical Actions, at the end of his life, for Grotowski it is Art as Vehicle, also at the end of his life. /.../

- Both methods follow the same principles - there is an inner flow and its outer expression in a strictly fixed form: improvisation and composition, spontaneity and discipline, inner and outer score, organic and artificial line.

- Both methodological parts are generated/ done according to precise prior instruction (training). Any kind of attempt to ignore the prior training declared as mandatory in both leads to imitation and mimicry.

- Both methods are very difficult to master, and require lengthy and detailed practice - The Physical Action Method, despite its apparent ease (compared to Grotowski's apparent difficulty), is equally difficult to achieve in order to be implemented as designed.

Regarding the exposition in the monograph, I consider the following remarks possible:

1) The perception of the self-analysis of exposition is that a thing is subjected to inspection through various views, as if the sum of them is to represent it not as what it is but as it is seen, so it appears to be actually existent(it), thought through subjectivizations. Projected through the construction of the statement (enumeration of one's sayings¹), however,

¹ According to the contemporary research available to us, Stanislavski was pressured in the editing of his major works by editors "appointed" to calculate his manuscripts to the dominant ideological paradigm of the time (we can judge the high degree of his self-censorship and the fearful limit of his publicity from their correspondence). Even if we accept these analyses as speculative - in their justification by the attempt to distinguish Stanislavski's image legacy from the Sovietization of the IHAT and the need to adapt it to historical (unconditional) stasis, in order to preserve his creative territory (as a projection of his vital one) - we can only think of the authenticity of the evidence of his creative and research process that has come down to us if we are able to "read" it from

contentment introduces the understanding that the otherness of its object is a naming of (something) otherwise unsayable and the distinctions (semantic dynamics) are not the view's containable but essentially its thinkings in different paradigms (hence the potential distinctions with inapplicable, and therefore left in its foreignness, concepts). Then-so it (the unspeakable) would not be as outside of them, but for them being (as transcendent), nothing would be-it is the action that defines the actual, because (the) acting (us) is and is therefore wholly of itself. And the 'physical' will be precisely the given in view, the wholly processual becoming (us). The body (in the radical saidness of the u-compacted) is our-us for all, there (in omnipresence) it is also us in becomingness, utterable as the nonsense of being - insofar as the idea of singularity is absent altogether in the universality of the transparent (because it is the timelessness of the species, with/too much/of being human). We are identity, but only in wonder at the refusal of the thing in the intelligibility of language to be (as being subjectivized), there (visible in openness - us) we are and somehow as in truth (being).

2) The emphasis of the first part of the exposition is that Stanislavski asserts the correlation of the mental and the physical. As if there is a way to separate , which at present (in the contemporary understanding problematizing the real and its utterability in general) seems to be a deliberate grasp (whereby the conscious is accorded operational fictionality). If so, it is not their disconnectedness that is being signalled, but the irrelevance to some notion of correlation. Some absence (of impact, "creativity"?). Then (in the absence of the thing and presenting it as a reality-presented sense of being) the becoming will also be the simple becoming (vital life) and not a play mechanism. It seems that for Stanislavski the primordial basis of his search is some manipulation of liveness, which will be revised not through perception but through rules of play, which will also be preset (that it is he, the authority, who will order us). What the bearer of the power impulse receives is a recognition of power (which cannot and will not fall away from life, but is a pre/on/legal life), it is both a result and (because it has-it-for-itself in the reconciliation through communion) a presumed goal (of the communion resulting from the

beyond (in counterpoint to) the literal character of his texts - they are fully in their intendedness (not for-us, but for others-us, and therefore passing us by, so passing us by).

The other pedestal of Dr. Odadzhiev's exposition - Grotowski - stands deliberately in the oral tradition (of transmission of knowledge) and in intentionality writes nothing about the substance of his work. His textual (non-epistolary) materials are notes from public exposés or comments and reminiscences of his collaborators, and with each substantial publication he not only edits them but (depending on the cultural particularities of the recipients) revises the content and arrangement of the collections (no compilation has ever been made for Bulgaria). It would seem that the arbitrary (by another) introduction of texts is illegitimate in terms of Grotowski's authorial (and life) conduct - it is right not to know things about him if we are likely to know them in their incompleteness (blaspheming him), which he cannot, in the liveliness (in the expansion of generativity over flesh) of his presence, correct (which is in the extreme an imposed domination of immediate experiences, consistent with the paratheatrical gnoseological tradition). The assumption is that any saying (utterance of the thing-of-things) also presupposes the status of those who understand it (according to Grotowski, in its extreme manifestations, the director is relevant in the theatricality of the "spiritual mentor") and is not the at-all-knowable. Because of the clarifications introduced, I argue that for both of the above-mentioned authorities on twentieth-century theatricality, the attribution (to their texts, let alone their bringing as a gesture of dissemination) should be further motivated through a stated authorization (involving the specification of the semantic agents of operation on the textual body), or the refinement of the terminology used (consistent with previous decisions, already validated by the insistence of their use, to enable the evaluation and systematization of information), limiting to the said the infinity of the delving discourse. Dr. Odadzhiev's exposition contains (though insufficiently systematized) indications of the conditions thus introduced for the communicative significance of what is said (in/for our culture), which gives me grounds for continuing the analysis, resisting the impossibility of formulating concepts and principles due to the semantic irrelevance of their includable characteristics.

reconciliation). Thus, the game says existence as signified by consent it to be functional, our existential becoming. It is not the rules (of the game) that change, but the degree of credibility to the existence of which the actual is immediacy. Therefore, it is not the physical actions (in a world adapted for this) that are operative, but the norms of rightness (the rules) that lay in the communion the credibility through which some world will be co-communicated in our meaningfulness. Stanislavski's project is thus transfusable from exploratory to creational - we have at our disposal through the action not the exaltation of a creative impulse through which the world will present itself to us as signifiable (played), but precisely that in its singularity it has become the World of communion, identified through precisely that system of language used as a resource of authority (one who has empowered such a world as a World to say). The pressure for a thing to be a reality is essentially a pressure to demarcate a communal area that will confess the so-so of the world in the authoritarian presence of the one saying it. The residence of spectacularity for each of its identifiable instances of number-ness (in fact becoming-ness) will be a potentiated universal appearance of a world insofar as it is a model of the situation of things (in an experience-as-actualizable-world). A thing will be a world, the World, if played in the norm of regularity it is (otherwise it will be nothing to us). Thus with every pointing (as to reality), Stanislavski points his own as to be ours, gathering us (to ourselves). Hence the resistance to his summoning by another (not-him), each otherness telling us itself as a delegated authority, which without Stanislavski it is not (because we are not with ourselves insofar as we are for Stanislavski's summoning). No one also seems to tell us anything about Stanislavski, because we already know him as just him, co-communicated to us (communicated to us), and so will be the invariability of any (his) saying which in its completeness will utter him - such to be (such described) in a world exhausted by naming him. His every saying thus erodes not Stanislavski's world, but the actuality of the communion to which he is drawn, so far as the authority of another becoming of credibility. Hence Stanislavski (Grotowski, who-is-named) cannot be communicated to us other than dead or in intentionality ("figured").

3) By his perceptual universality, the world is fully exposed in what is available to us, and by his metal economy of meaning, what is available is necessary (after Hegel ²). Hence also the apparent as being natural (material, physical, compacted to the simply material) is such in a regularity to which it is merely a pediscipline and to which it is related as an effect. The physical seems to be reliably present only if (in a reversal of sensibility) it can be grounded. Thus, the

² The introduction of the concept "Hegel" seems accidental, but the Heidegger, Hursel, Jung and Hindu mystics mentioned in the exposition are not used as a stable conceptual or terminological key, rather, the exposition traces the 'dialectic' of understanding physical action, from the validation of circumstance in Stanislavski and early Grotowski, Barba and mature Grotowski, to the moveable signifier of the stage act and its fixation by the witness in post-dramatic convention, to Grotowski's recent studies (when he speaks of vibration not as an act but as an effect - the Performer in its radicality is simply present), introducing at each phase its appropriate analytical toolkit (the mechanism of signification is itself communicative-functional - in the linguistic convention of the conceptual frame validating the correspondence of the gnoseological status of syllogisms). In this, Dr. Odadzhiev authorizes himself through the selection of the objects of his attention - M. Chekhov and V. Meyerhold are only marked (ignoring their contributions to understanding the psychophysical nature of action), and the lack of problematic discourse analysis (judgments are always indicative of what is found in the authorities and argued through them just so, as the quotations support the judgments) turns the exposition into an "authorial" (Dr. Odadzhiev's) compiled anthology on the subject (in comprehensiveness introduced through extensive citations and thus "mythologized" - after Barth).

appearance would consist as being motivated, whereby its presentation as being available under the motive (of its becoming when it is registerable as already available) would be understood as the necessity (of it). Necessity is thus that which will legitimate it, without being introduced at all as its cause, of which the available and does not appear as a (temporized) following, but in the simultaneity of its becoming and its tautology - that which is will be insofar as it is gatherable around a groaning phenomena necessity. The perception of what is available offers nothing but a gnoseological volume of the 'state of affairs defining the world, which is why appearance is tantamount to a symptomaticity of the necessary in which it will be offered to us by saying (it) as intelligible (utterable). It seems every necessity to have us in mind, such to be for someone, in his straightness (because he has foreseen it). Thus the available, in that it is such for us (so it seems to us to be the necessary) as being just the one meant to find it in necessity, subjectivizes us. Any saying of the available defines not another but the saying, insofar as the apparent as universal is in the non-arbitrariness of materiality available to everyone in humanity (it is in the mode of obviousness) and, if it were not producing subjectivity, would not need to be said. So too, saying does not order (not assert) the actual, but constitutes it, and thereby also defines the action (itself) as that which will define this same actual (at least for the contents, of this knowable, of just-this subjectivation, availability). Action and actual seem to be present in their simultaneity because they are present through necessity³. Because of the preceding, acting takes everything beyond the available, beyond the physical, into becoming. If something is available, then it is somehow becoming, and it can be grounded in an arbitrariness of saying, withholding being in permanence necessary (at least for the one who in intelligibility will communicate it to us). It seems that we can only speak of the metaphysical (beyond our physicality in appearance) in the contingency of some unnecessary availability, which we will also be able to claim is accidental (it is subjectless because it does not contain the thing- said by the speaker). Thus the metaphysical will have to be made sense of through some additionality, in the addition of its cause, which will also distinguish actions (in the non-arbitrariness of our actuality) from movements, which will also be just-themselves, without being correlated with a motive of subjectivity. It seems the world is what it is and is such knowable if we add to it meaningfulness (us), otherwise it is a multiplicity of everything possibilities, through which it is also incommunicability (inasmuch as the functional of sayability is none other than our assemblage in sociability). Any delving into more than mental economy should understand the random outpouring of the vital (as in World-us projection), but

³ Apart from mental and physical connotation, the action can also be thought through the social (the positive-us in the contingency of the historical), the biological (biology of behavior, as from something determinacy of acting), and the linguistic (we can say in correctness only the gnoseologically valid, we should be able to think it in intelligibility) - the latter (without exhausting the possible) are excluded from Ph.D. Odadzhiev's analysis. If the action is productive, then it points to something else resisting it, of which it will be (a symptom) a more or less conventional presentation. I emphasize that at the apogee of Dr. Odadzhiev's exposition, movement is not presentational; it is precisely the same as becoming (see on Richards, pp. 229-231), coveted by Grotowski as a "meme" (a morpheme functioning as an outpouring of archetypically in visibility) that signifies nothing insofar as it is tautological of any agreeable universality (self-significance is, acting as the World, "The Action," pp. 197-198, 205-216, launched from his/her contemporary universal mythologem - the absence of a universal, common to us, myth; in the literality of action - after Artaud).

it is also too laborious a comprehensibility, which is why it seems impenetrable, incoherent - not at all spectacular. Hence the spectacular is not a simple reduction of the vital, but its counterpoint through which to define it - a spectacle in the proposed understanding is that which is not a simple extraction from the mundane, but the intelligible (utterable through the language of spectacularity available to it). For the purposes of this exposition, the spectacular will only be the devitalised through the mental economy, which is also just that, of the situation of things in the certifiable of their being said as from some already empirically explicable world. This is to point out that spectacularity corresponds to some eventuality of saying, and it is such if it succeeds in taking off the time of becoming into an act of acting appearing to the world to do so (in) reality. Eventuality would be defined as the wonder, not of the becoming itself, but of its utterability, and thus would distinguish it from the anyway vital becoming. The spectacular is such only if it is in intentionality, of which it is also made, which is why its saying is always its own technology of becoming. The spectacular is ultimately defined as a technology, not a perception (because it cannot distinguish it from the mundane of becoming anyway). Because of the above, we find spectacularity in the actual as being transmissible (because it is something, a *techne*, that can be transmitted, once it has been communicated). Thus the world seems to have its "pedagogical aspect" for the needs of some saying of the available. But only if the saying is thought through an empowerment of the sayer, arrived at in the meaning as the necessity belonging to the intelligibility of the (otherwise somehow) acting. Therefore, the statement (one's, for it is always "one's") has to make clear (by communicating to us something as authoritative, through authority, said) what has already happened, insofar as for us it is until then untrustworthy saidness - thus its deadness. Occurrence is in attributing itself to some not-for-us (thus not-with-us) becomingness. The saying of what has already happened does not assert it truthfully at all but actualizes it (for us). The function of its becoming-as-it-is-actuality simply defines a trust in which to be present its gone things (so too Stanislavski, Grotowski, etc.), to which the meaningfulness will be an attribution insofar as it cannot be such outside the actuality of intelligibility, and this is entailed for any presentness of saying. But actuality triggers trust in the meaningfulness of communion, whereby, paradoxically, actualization says the universal of the available more than it individuates the sayer (who might well be the one who chooses precisely to call out of what is already happening and so be someone of the intelligible), which explains our impactful submission to authority through citation. Actualizing does not say citing it but declares our belonging to a community of those who thus understand the state of affairs (which intelligibility has already been made clear in the anticipation of saying them). Actuality utterly rejects the inquiry into authorship since it is from the credibility embedded in language that we benefit - language is everyone's, gathered in the areal of the credulous, and from it will flow any speech that also cannot say anything other than its protocol of agreement ⁴. Whatever we say will be meaningless insofar

⁴ In the narrative of my comments, Ph. D. Odadzhiev's exposition is not a critical writing, intended to dialogue within itself and thus outline the parameters of its credibility, but a narration of appearances that narrate themselves (their presentation, a presentation of temporalized existences). Therefore, the author knows the same as the objects of unfolding/narrating, formally present (cited) as subjects of utterance, i.e., they are self-exhausted in the proper self (as if the inquiry into truthfulness is whether I am synchronous to what has already been said, not whether the thing of being said is such beyond the correctness of the linguistic correspondence of utterance). They (the paternalism of their authorities) are also apologetically celebrated, calculable to some gathering theme (which resembles their meanings but could also be their other-to-freedom discursive gathering).

as its contents have no relevance to actuality - they will be appearances of the universality of the meaningful-us. This is what makes saying in articularity possible at all.

1. The set of materials presented by Krasimira Tsvetanova Ivanova, Ph.D. focuses on the realization of stage and screen products.

Due to the non-provision of the full texts of Dr. Ilieva's articles, one can get only a superficial idea of the coverage of her analytical approaches in the range of publications that are freely available. Based on what I have seen through the articles, I consider the following remarks possible

1) The article "Transformations of Conflict in the Modern Dramaturgical Text. The aspect of intertextual interactions in the motif of Ulysses /2017/"

The text does not contain a definition of conflict, it is submitted for Ulysses as bearing (borne by) "binary oppositions" (quotation after Wollen 1972 - with an explanatory note), and postmodern narratives are drawn into the analysis (see Baumann in the article), whereby modernity is no longer thought-in-itself and "instrumentalizes" the exposition. In this conceptual niche, what versus what yields the status ("nature" - in an arbitrary but accepted naming by theatre theory and practice) of conflict and its corresponding "kind" of drama remains unexplored, hence information about the manifestations of conflict is simply a listing of approaches ("through the prism of intertextuality" - in Ph.D. Ivanova's annotation) that lacks a unifying research principle (apart from the Ulysses indicator). Thus, the narrative implicitly asserts that one is not necessary in the perspective of the motif polychromy (of the "Ulysses" motif), and the statement accommodates its meaningfulness in the syllogistic repertoire of the narrator⁵.

The conflict marks (in its constructivist sense set by Ph.D. Ivanova) a conditional border between "things" that indicates nothing else but the convergence of characteristics (contained in those same things). This convergence is to be thought of as their appropriateness in relation to some non-freeness of being everything. That is, they are to be in the deprivation of being (bearability in) the flow of life and will be some happening to it (of this, so being experienced as just-this, so becoming life for us)⁶, whereby the construct (oppositions in their

⁵ In Ivanova's Ph.D. analysis of the Odysseus motif, the construction of the exposition cannot be sustained due to the attempt to fit into an arbitrary set the variations of the thesis and the derivation of the sayings from the dichotomy of the discourse - the last paragraph (where the summary should be a new paradigm of the sayings is proposed) does not synchronize with the main thesis but stands in detachment from it. The preceding demonstrates an effort to give another discursive perspective to what is thought, but also marks the untrustworthiness (unreliability) of the narrator, sabotaging the implicit hegemon of sayings in the textual corpus.

⁶ Conflict thus signals both the experientiality and intelligibility of borderline similarities, which, according to Jung, in the course of individuation (in the paradigm of Ivanova's Ph.D. article, "**Application of Jungian Approach and Significant Sociological Research to the Teaching of Dramaturgy for Musical Theatre**") should be taken away as they are comprehended ("illuminated" by rationality and thus applied to order). That is, conflict is an experiential function of unconsciousness (ignorance marking unreason) and can be conceptually corrected. If we know the language in which disharmonies are shared, then we know them fully, and consequently nothing and cannot think of the experience (except its painfulness, some toxic, affective tension) if we do not know the concepts that co-share it in communion. Thus they are either incommunicable, or they are not (not at all) up to being called (the some-thing, in the intelligible-ness of it). It seems that (in the radicality of the thesis) it is not language that is the explication of affective contents, but what affective contents we will have been trained (in

subordination) functioning will call the meanings of the available-for us. Because of these peculiarities, the construct "conflict" postulates singularity and is both happening and happened in every act of conceiving (in which we will decide whether we are to be living in this-such "reality," no less), it seems to be actuality, suspending the times of becoming of things in their arbitrariness. Conflict is a meaning agent (of some discrete monistic "now" put into a singular series synchronized through the fitness of propositions) through which intelligibility radiates out to the world-not-in-being, thus preventing the explosion of the all-possible happening in simultaneity all and therefore unthinkable (the mythic "eternal" of the happening always as terribly real-us). Conflict as an aspect of the mythic (the narrative) in general is sensed to be a presupposition of some change, hence tracing it will give narrative, being the case complex in the temporality of comprehensibility (applied to the thought known). In her quasi-exist gesture of situating itself in the understandable, personification is presupposed by becoming, and the name (the naming is the generically probable of behavior before it is meaningful as patterned) will bear the characteristic of the so-doer (for the first time, suddenly and forever so). On the other hand, the possibility of the thing being done at all for the myth is variable, unconstrained by any characteristic of the character (insofar as the character is not only capable of doing the thing) - hence it is a simple "motivic" fragment around which variations will cluster (of the possible happening in its countlessness and in the simultaneity of all the instances of its happening in comprehensibility). Thus, the dual opposition builds modules of intelligibility, aside from the linguistic requirement that the naming of something (someone-something in its intelligibility) be tied to its description, which in the myth complex would be impossible due to the non-finiteness of variation (the vocabulary that satisfies the definiteness condition does not tolerate the simplifications of conflict and allows for mental inertia, presupposing the functioning of language as a system - a circular description of the unknowable with other things unknown to us, in the clarification of which the same defined in the antecedent will accordingly be included, which presupposes language as openness and inconclusiveness, but grounds its containment in the credibility of the applicability of the sayings to a consensual image of the actual). I draw attention to the incompatibility of the aspects of myth (in its commitment to the ontological fullness of the ritual) and the performative incompleteness of spectacle (it is by convention wordlessness, the "speech" of the subject of meaning-making in a play-protocol), in which the secondary nature of the dramatic sequence (in this case as thought to be the Odysseus motif) is evident.

the experience of the interactions in which we have been understood - analysed) to point to as comprehensible in the culturality that is defined as the areal of those who know the language in which (something comprehensible) is communicated. Jung claims (in a highly simplified reading of him - insofar as he is a clinical therapist generalisations are problematic) that epiphanic outpourings into the mind of his contemporaries have an incidental and impermanent effect without forming a numinous transformation of life - so they are just culturalities, impacting us like a logo (something that has its magical impact because of its communicative content, not because of the archetypal, with corresponding emotional energy, lifting of a culturally unconscious layer from the "cartography of the unconscious"). That is, any making of art out of knowledge of the "archetypal" not only signals no species-experiential actualization of meaning, but in mental fatigue demonstrates erudition - part of an educational layer of communicative competencies (which finds nothing in the array of the manifest, but relies in/as the world on what is already known from language), which is meant to socialize us through the secondness of the knowable, rather than being a spontaneous and autonomous vitality (which will be as-true, in the amazingness of its becoming). Making art through the artificiality of the communicatively permissible is simply separating it from the actuality of the everyday and is a simulation in the paradoxicality of knowing that something (the world) is imitated as-reality (postmodern) and there is no more of it than that.

Conflict (in an abstract understanding of it, which obscures the contradiction arising from the requirement of a description of something/someone introduced above) is nothing other than a possible reversal of meanings that are defined through the distance from something, in its responsiveness, and are precisely its correspondent in the rhetorical dilemma. They are not other (than what they are) because that is the only way they are separable and keep the nostalgia of the continuum from which they are withdrawn without excluding it (not meaningfully). In saying something, we are saying that we have withdrawn it through pointing to it from everything else we remember and know in its simultaneity, but we are saying for some reason, in the intentionality of the stopping, precisely (named) that - precisely-that which is illuminated by intelligibility as not-all (left over). But separateness will find its purpose (and meaning) only in the situating among the availabilities it will raise through its separation. It seems as if the specification of the something-thing defines not it, but the world in which it is credible to be (as that something). Empiricism is thus not other-itself, but a functional instrument of the times in which actuality as being-world endures (if they are the norm of meaning-making, its process). It remains to be said that conflictuality is only possible in the areal postulated by intelligibility and that any naming by presupposition of its very naming should be intelligible (I cannot say the incomprehensible insofar as making it as if it were such as dressing it in its intelligibility).

And more. The limitation of the intelligibility of conflicts (and the "reality" they claim) is marked by the possibility of the ambivalent (in paradoxical simultaneity) experience of their content (the affects we point to as their bearers). The dramaturgy of becoming (the sequence of the taking down of conflicts in the World) remains to be a gnoseological (cognitive) rather than an aesthetic tool, and offers not a model of transformation of conflicts (as it would be if it were a closed logical system where the radicalization of the something-that-will expose it in the other-that), but a conceptual matrix through a refusal to describe the thing-in-itself as a narrative of living. The object of the gnoseological model remains to be not the world (and knowledge of it), but the appropriation of the initiative to narrate liveness as put-in-reality, formed through contrasting casings (dialogue, in the tension of the 'dramatic' understandable to us).

- 1) The article «THE SUCCESS OF THE FILM MUSICAL – PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL PREREQUISITES OF THE USAGE OF MUSIC IN THE AUDIENCE`S FAVORITE GENRE /2019/ “

The exposition starts with the introduction of a thesis about "torsion fields" (which are not theorized) and the impact of music on them, then - through the statement "it is proven" - follows another thesis, without relevant citations of evidence (or authoritative sources), in an argumentation resting on simple statements, exempt from criteria for their truth (later in the text "music has been known for a long time", "the musical is accused", "the spectator always perceives"). The sense in reading is of an occultation of knowledge - it is an areal of mysterious knowledge that is inaccessible to the unaware and unconditional and functioning as if it were a true reality, given sufficiency to understand what is being said - it will reject any of my (one's) personal experience as such (subjective and areal because it is of the unenlightened), superimposed into intelligibility by the incompetent (because not trained in psychoanalysis which is the decoder of all that is knowable?⁷). The style, compared to the previous article, has

⁷ See "...This explains why *Brilliantine* (1978), and *Chicago* (2002), have the highest "lifetime" revenue in the genre. They use the schemes in question, though without turning the archetypes into

visibly degraded; there are slang expressions here ("of the sort of", "dramaturgical patches", "the musical loses", "cleverly played", "it's worth it"), which eliminates not just the scholarly quality of the text, but also the credibility of the reflected meaningfulness of meanings (not something we are not told, but something that makes no sense to be told at all, insofar as it is not in the norm of telling the truthful⁸).

The destructive in terms of Ph.D. Ivanova's invention (assumed, according to her cover letter) the discrepancy between her qualifications (the accumulated - assumed - life experience and erudition demonstrated in the previous publication) and the result of her work with actors (in the competition materials), due to the placement of the stage material in the service of some ("universalized") knowledge that will be manifested and used in a speculative (cultural) intentionality, exposes a distrust of the actuality of the communion with the spectator. The witness of the spectacular act is merely undergoing the invasion of cultural (as-didactic), not implicated in the state of metaphysical concurrence of the initiator of the encounter, which transforms the convention of communion and reduces it to the vulgarizations of its spectacularity (as 'entertainment', a marketplace of successes or 'propaganda' of correctness is). It should also be noted that the creation of cultural and mental clichés, which caricature the actuality of sociality and imply a naive social adaptation, seems to be a vice of publicity in general, but also its legitimation as a media construct (cf. Ph. D. Ivanova's article **"Psychodrama Methods in Working with Students Studying Drama Theatre Acting"**. Page 32)⁹. Insofar as, by the definability of saying (in my understanding), art is the unbounded

stereotypes, with an eye toward "white-thread stitching" - they use them creatively, with due respect for the dramaturgy. And the audience appreciates it: the comparison by profit: "Brilliantine"-188,389,888; "Chicago"-170,687,518; "Mamma Mia!"-144,130,063" (p. 55).

⁸ According to the Introduction, "...This paper will examine the music component in terms of its undeniable indispensability in the impact of film on the viewer. It will examine the success of the musical from the perspective of perceptual psychology" (p. 54) The musical is argued in the exposition through film examples but with the exception of what is said about the choreography ("...Spatial drawing and editing" (p. 57), nowhere is a specific understanding derived from film studies and thinking about cinema as, after all, the art of the frame and the relations of what is excluded from it as an unreflected but meant, deliberately excluded world, juxtaposed to the "made" (and thus terminologically opposed), framed conceptually as the to-be/not-to-be coherent, the true-us, visibility (for through the mediation of the cinematic even documents "lie" - cf. The theory of the documentary in the documentary **"On the possibility of living"** scripted by Ph.D. Ivanova). Thus, even if the exposition concerns some psychology of the perception of the screen spectacle, there is no way (what) to distinguish it from the everyday available-not through the medial and the gnoseological ghetto of "...repetitiveness. It is not only a musical mode, but e.g. the musicologist Middleton finds its social-psychological roots in the pleasure of 'all the same' from the 'predictable'. And Adorno sees it as the weapon of mass culture's mass defeat - bearing only the triumph of depersonalization, 'the invasion of the common, the trivial, the elemental, understood as a manifestation of the unambiguous dictates of industrial reproduction' (Levi, K., 2005)" (p. 57). Hence the notion of success needs no definition - it would be a concluded pact organised around a consumerist ideal of (co-)living. The use of psychodramatic methods in the training of actors has a tradition of several decades in Bulgaria (TC "L. Groys" and NBU), thanks to the work of David Jeroham, Tsvetelina Yosifova, Tsvetelina Georgieva, etc., and is motivated in numerous publications (including on the problem areas in the work - cf. Ph.D. Ivanova "Psychodrama Methods in Working with Students Studying Drama Theatre Acting". Pg. 33), training sessions have been conducted and there are training courses in place in the ADT programme of the university.

⁹ The use of psychodrama methods in the training of actors has a tradition of several decades in Bulgaria (TC "L. Groys" and NBU), thanks to the work of David Jeroham, Tsvetelina Yosifova, Tsvetelina Georgieva and others, and is motivated in numerous publications (including on the problem areas in the work - cf. Dr. Ivanova **"Psychodrama Methods in Working with Students Studying Drama Theatre Acting"**. Pg. 33), training sessions have been conducted and there are training courses in place in the ADT programme of the university.

territory of our freedom, any imposition of rules seems unjustifiable (including the "norm" of not postulating protocols of regularities is valid until overcome by the liveliness of art) and therefore the public act emanates nothing but the image of life of its initiator. It is with it (the image), not with the regularities (gnoseological, aesthetic or ethical) that we may or may not be in coherence, in arbitrariness-not in sympathy (together in meaningfulness to be).

CONCLUSION

Ph.D. Ivanova's documents for the competition for "associate professor" at the University of Plovdiv are available and present her as a specialist with an orientation towards working with adolescents, but they are not completed accurately (there are repetitions, illegibility and shuffling in the scanned material, a monograph on "The Success of the Musical in Film and Theatre" was dropped, which is not accounted for in the materials inventory provided and is scored in one of several attached Regulations for the implementation of the law on the development of academic staff in the republic of Bulgaria references), making it difficult to navigate the evidence (mainly in the section on leadership and project participation). In the absence of published scientific metrics in NACID and attached information on the doctoral thesis of Ph.D. Ivanova, it is not possible to assess whether the articles dated before 2015 were used in the previous procedure (for the Ph.D. degree in Theatre Studies and Theatre Art), which would prevent their scoring in the indicators of the current competition. There is also an apparent non-compliance with the "Additional requirements for admission to the competition for the academic position of "Associate Professor" in the Faculty of Education of the University of Plovdiv" - there is an article in an indexed edition under print during the competition (Ivanova K. National ideology through the prism of dramaturgy. *Orbis Linguarum (Language World)*), which should not be accepted for scoring, following the principle introduced for the monograph.

Ph.D. Odadzhiev presents evidence of convincingly meeting (to an increased degree) the legal requirements for the academic position of Associate Professor in the scientific field 8. Arts. Ph.D. Odadzhiev's proposed exposition in the monograph "Physical Action in the Psychological and Metaphysical Theatre (The Laboratories of K. S. Stanislavsky and J. Grotowski. Pedagogical Aspects)" contains distinct contributory elements: a reflection on the inquiry (of Anatoly Vasiliev) "how it came to the point that the very understanding of action /.../ is interpreted only at the most superficial levels" (p. 21); introducing through his own translation into the theoretical organon of Bulgarian theatre studies new for him (unpopular) metatexts (of the students and ideological successors of Stanislavsky and Grotowski). Ph.D. Odadzhiev's qualification, acquired as a result of two doctoral degrees (from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in Film Studies, Film Art and Directing and from the NBU in Music and Dance Art), his theoretical publications (in a wide thematic range, including general and special theory of art and art management) in prestigious scientific journals, as well as his professional experience (with numerous authoritative reflections and awards) are also essential for the outcome of the competition. The following problems are evident in Ph.D. Odadzhiev's evidence under indicator " D" of the Regulations for the implementation of the law on the development of academic staff in the Republic of Bulgaria: characteristic of reviews in review articles are the publications Plamenov P. "On Bulgarian Opera Aesthetics" and Georgiev K. "Documentary Cinema in Bulgariq 2007"; interviews with Hristova M. "A filmmaker in New York". "Screen" magazine and Atanasova A. "Film without emotions is doomed". The above materials are inadmissible evidence under indicator "D". Required points for the competition are: 40 points for indicator " D" and 20 points for 1.3 of the "Additional requirements for admission to the competition for the academic position of "Associate Professor" at the Faculty

of Education of the University of Plovdiv", the total required points are 60. Ph.D. Odadzhiev proves 100 points (the article Toshev G. "Our film in Munich" is available in folder 13.1. Records of the author's artwork), which are more than the required number. After reading the materials and scientific works presented for the competition, analyzing their significance and the scientific, scientific-applied and applied contributions contained in them, I find it justified to give my **positive** assessment and **to** recommend the Scientific Jury to prepare a report-proposal to the Faculty Council of the Faculty of Education for the election of Ph.D. Petar Zapryanov Odadzhiev to the academic position of "Associate Professor" at Plovdiv University Paisii Hilendarski in: field of higher education 8. Arts., professional field 8.4. 4. Theatre and film art, scientific specialty "Theatre Studies and Theatre Art" ("Acting for Drama Theatre").

07.08.2023 г.

Reviewer:

/Assoc. Prof. Valery Perlikov/