

ANNOTATION

OF THE MATERIALS FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE COMPETITION AND SELF-EVALUATION OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS

I. A LIST OF PUBLICATION FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE COMPETITION

1. Monography:

1.1. Asparuhov, V. 2019, *Synthesis, Apperceptions, Unities*. Sofia: Heterodoxia Foundation, ISBN: 978-619-91341-0-8;

1.2. Asparuhov, V. 2018, *Russell: philosophical logic and the problem of the logical form*. Sofia, ISBN: 978-619-188-229-8;

2. Papers:

2.1. Asparuhov, V. 2017, „Transcendental Strata in Russell’s Philosophical Logic“. In: *Critique & Humanism*, Vol. 47, issue 1/2017, pp. 441-472, ISSN: 0861 1718;

3. Articles in scientific editions:

3.1. Asparuhov, V. 2002, „The Subject Matter of Philosophical Logic and Russell’s Contribution for its Elaboration“. In: *Philosophical Readings*, Lik, pp. 215-225, ISBN 954-607-572-8;

3.2. Asparuhov, V. 2003, „What is Philosophical Logic in ‘What is Logic (1912)’“. In: *Values and Valuables Orientations*. V. Tarnovo, pp. 41-48, ISBN 954-524-378-3;

- 3.3.** Asparuhov, V. 2007, „On the Philosophical Logic in *What is Logic?* (1912)“. In: *Philosophy*, issue 3, pp. 84-93, ISSN 0861-6302;
- 3.4.** Asparuhov, V. 2010, „Old-fashioned Logic“. In: *Culture*, issue 23, p. 3, ISSN 0861-1408;
- 3.5.** Asparuhov, V. 2015, „Subjects, Propositions, Complexes: the hidden transcendentalism in *The Principles of Mathematics*“. In: Beshkova, A., Latinov, E., Polimenov, T. (eds.) *The Logical Tradition. Essays in Honour of Prof. Vitan Stefanov*. Sofia, pp. 96-114, ISBN 978-954-07-3956-4;
- 3.6.** Asparuhov, V. 2017, „On What There Isn't “. In: *Philosophical Alternatives*, issue 2-3, pp. 176-190, ISSN: 0861-7899;
- 3.7.** Asparuhov, V. 2017, „Thermonuclear and Other Syntheses“. In: *Καιρός*, E-Journal, issue 2, pp. 61-69, ISSN: 2534-8442;
- 3.8.** Asparuhov, V. 2018, „Meinong in the Light of Russell's Philosophical Logic“. In: *Language & Publicity*, E-Journal, NBU (in print);
- 3.9.** Asparuhov, V. 2018, „Logical Experience, Logical Imagination, Indefinable Concepts“. In: *Καιρός*, E-Journal, issue 3, pp. 128-136, ISSN: 2534-8442;
- 3.10.** Asparuhov, V. 2019, „Kant or Cant(or)“. In: *Philosophy*, issue 3, ISSN 0861-6302 (in print);
- 3.11.** Asparuhov, V. 2019, „The Perception of Logical Objects (Russell and Kant)“. In: *Καιρός*, E-Journal, issue 4, pp. 9-15, ISSN: 2534-8442;

II. ANNOTATIONS AND ABSTRACTS

Monography:

1.1. Asparuhov, V. 2019, *Synthesis, Apperceptions, Unities*. Sofia: *Heterodoxia* Foundation, ISBN: 978-619-91341-0-8

Abstract:

The book attempts to discuss an essential but also profoundly unclear and even concealed aspect of Russell's philosophy. There is the conjecture that Kant remains the actual intellectual provocation to the projects, including the logical ones, of Russell, although he doesn't admit of such an influence. Kant speaking through Russell without Russell being aware of that – this is very reminiscent of the situation around the neurotic polemics between Russell and Wittgenstein regarding the foundations of logic. It is in relation to these foundations that the text proposes us to see the British philosopher as tempted to stay close to the radical originary gesture of the classical philosophical modernity. It proposes to us to see him as the last defender of the possibility of classical philosophical disciplining. His philosophical logic, together with Husserl's phenomenology, is probably the concluding version of that epistemological strategy that seeks to understand and make the others understand the foundations of the logical. As an attempt to reach some simple entities from which to start the deployment of his constructive project that would 'put philosophy on the secure path of science', his philosophical logic is inscribed through the originary gesture into the tradition of Descartes and Kant. On the other hand, Russell's origin-setting lacks the requirement of a transcendental subject who would set the limits and thinkability, and this absence keeps him at a distance from the tradition of transcendentalism. An important task to this study is to establish the perimeter of philosophical logic. A sketched and undeveloped project doomed to inhabit the zone of indeterminacy mostly because the transcendental motives, remaining unclarified, that have emerged, unexpectedly even to Russell himself, out of the problems he was grappling with. Of course it is not claimed that Russell would accept the existence of such motives. The leading assumption is that, contrary to traditional evaluations, in the early works of the father of logicism, there is something that not merely surreptitiously lurks but has a stable

presence: a transcendental vault that carries the weight of philosophical-logical construction and obliges us to pay attention to it. The claim of the text and its big challenge (and maybe also its provocation) is to be an attempt for a systematic search of the said transcendental questions, and not as remnants of the idealist past of which Russell unyieldingly wishes to escape, but as traces in the very logical data that he comes upon. In the data, i.e. in what he comes upon and analyzes, the expectation is concentrated of grasping that specific transcendentalism (quite different from his Kantian legacy) that returns and comes upon him as an unrecognized transcendental impulse.

1.2. Asparuhov, V. 2018, *Russell: philosophical logic and the problem of logical form*. Sofia, ISBN: 978-619-188-229-8;

Abstract:

The monography discusses the emergence and development of the logical problematic as elaborated in diverse aspects of Bertrand Russell's early works. The process of its formation is viewed as especially important to the development of the analytic philosophical tradition, having in mind that similar problems were elaborated also in logical traditions that were alternative, even incommensurable, to analytic philosophizing. The object of study is the attempt to turn the philosophical-logical into an autonomous scientific field for whose constitution it was primarily needed to overcome the authority of the tradition of logic that dominated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Besides the need for epistemological legitimation, this attempt is also underpinned by the principal impossibility to do philosophical logic without ontological premises. Such a strategy is not a registered brand of analytic philosophizing, it can also be found in British neo-Hegelianism as well as in the phenomenological milieu. The limits of the study are set by the chronological development of the philosophical-logical mostly as a way of making logic, with some reservations typical for Russell in his early – and no doubt original, despite the fact that some of them were left unpublished – texts in logic. Since a large part of his ideas stay in the shadow of mathematical logic, philosophical logic misses the opportunity to get a leading role in the specialized scientific discourse. It is only in the second half of the 20th c. that it receives a

chance for meaning clarification, mostly thanks to Wittgenstein and his followers. The sources to the study are Russell's texts – from *Principles of Mathematics* through *On Denoting* and *What Is Logic (1912)* and *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. An additional body of texts are the works of the young Wittgenstein, despite his categorical refusal to accept the existence of philosophical logic, as well as the interpretations on Russell by Merdjanov, Quine, Ayer, Hilton, Griffin etc.

Papers:

2.1. Asparuhov, V. 2017, „Transcendental Strata in Russell's Philosophical Logic“. In: *Critique & Humanism*, Vol. 47, issue 1/2017, pp. 441-472, ISSN: 0861 1718.

Abstract:

The failure to demarcate the field of philosophical logic is in the basis of many of the difficulties that arise when Russell tries to form his own conception for logical analysis. The article considers Russell's fragmentary conception of analysis. An attempt is proposed to locate and elucidate a transcendental component that could be visible when we are focused on his analytical practice. Series of suggestions about transcendental strata upon Russell's thoughts are following, but although they are polemical, in my opinion they have the power to form an impulse for outlining the aria of philosophical logic. This enables the author to sketch out a transcendental point of view, founded in a presumption that there isn't an active transcendental subject.

Articles:

3.1. Asparuhov, V. 2002, „The Subject Matter of Philosophical Logic and Russell's Contribution for its Elaboration“. In: *Philosophical Readings*, Lik, pp. 215-225, ISBN 954-607-572-8;

Abstract:

Based on the premise that philosophical logic has merged with the millennial philosophical tradition, the article stakes on its possible rediscovery. A rediscovery through transcending the tension of the traditional philosophical regions – the ontological and the logical one. The solutions are discussed of such most authoritative thinkers of the 20th c. as Quine, Hintikka, Putnam, and themes and central concepts are enumerated around which philosophical-logical interest is accumulated. Arguments are sought to support the thesis that although not having a discernible relief, philosophical logic is a meta-language importing ontologism into 'pure' logics.

3.2. Asparuhov, V. 2003, „What is Philosophical Logic in ‘What is Logic (1912)’”. B: *Values and Valuables Orientations*. V. Tarnovo, pp. 41-48, ISBN 954-524-378-3;

Abstract:

The article discusses a possibility of thinking philosophical logic as an intellectual field situated by the failures of the British logician Bertrand Russell on the main philosophical areas – the ontological and the epistemological one. In this sense, the link between two of his projects is sought for: the large and influential text of the *Principles* and the insignificant unpublished draft for an article of 1912. The hypothesis is considered of one of the most careful researchers of Russell's logic, Nicholas Griffin, that the article project of 1912 is due to Russell's attempt to improve his multiple relation theory of judgment created a few years earlier. In the light of that theory, a possibility is seen for *logical form* to come among the objects with which the *subject* is acquainted. It is this possibility that actualized the interest to the problem of the nature of logic.

3.3. Asparuhov, V. 2007, „On the Philosophical Logic in *What is Logic?* (1912)““. In: *Philosophy*, issue 3, pp. 84-93, ISSN 0861-6302;

Abstract:

Despite looking like a careful commentary to a short unpublished Russell's manuscript, this text means to peek into the register of the private. The intention is to trace the sequence of states of 'complete intellectual stagnation' that make Russell ultimately give up writing his 'Treatise on logic'. The starting premise retains the fact that the philosophical-logical problematic of *Principles of Mathematic* (1903) returns in the article project under the working title of *What is Logic* (1912). A prelude to the substantial part of the exposition is a story on the amazing intellectual situation that brought together Russell and the 'young' Wittgenstein and soon after, reverses the symbolic roles between them. The narrative is based on a deeply personal but also intellectual epistolary exchange between the British philosopher and Lady Ottoline Morrell. The article strives to elucidate the link between undefinables and logical forms and maintains the view that the latter are the meaning heir to the essences of philosophical logic.

3.4. Asparuhov, V. 2010, „Old-fashioned Logic“. B: *Culture*, issue 23, p. 3, ISSN 0861-1408;

Abstract:

The occasion and purpose of this article are related to the publication in one book body of the logical and epistemological works of Prof. Dobrin Spasov. *Logic based on Ontology* (2010), however, is not another philosophical atlas book. Despite respecting with its more than 600 pages, the text is attractive with the 'philosophical profoundness' in 'a time when the prudence of interpreters is preferred over the braveness of innovators'. Beyond the bibliographical even, however, the intention of the text is to outline the motives that moved the formation of splendid philosophical-logical solutions, of that 'ontological resolve for logical solutions' from which a whole tradition emerged and established itself in the Bulgarian humanities' knowledge. Its most recognizable indicators are 'the synthetic notion of relational property' and the original and consistent research program called 'theory of the internal-external character of relations'. It is considered also that this tradition is so flexible that it seems to force its followers to renounce it, to abandon it, in order to turn to

their own thoughts and only after reaching a certain point, look back for it in order to learn through it.

3.5. Asparuhov, V. 2015, „Subjects, Propositions, Complexes: the hidden transcendentalism in *The Principles of Mathematics*”. In: Beshkova, A., Latinov, E., Polimenov, T. (eds.) *The Logical Tradition. Essays in Honour of Prof. Vitan Stefanov*. Sofia, pp. 96-114, ISBN 978-954-07-3956-4;

Abstract:

The article discusses the transcendental traits in some of Russell's theories maintained in the period of his post-idealist philosophy. In the perspective of the discovery of logical experience, they point to an unremoved but also unremovable transcendental element. The design is, by a series of receptions, to reveal and interpret that element. The leading conjecture is that immediately after the 'cooling down' of passions around the 'rebellion against idealism', Russell continues to use mental figures referable to his idealist past although generated not by this past but by the immediate problems that his thinking faces. The historical-philosophical context is outlined against whose background the question can be raised of the possible transcendentalist motivations related to the solution of some logical difficulties. According to that, it is not Kant's ideas but those of the British neo-Hegelian Thomas Hill Greene that directly influence Russell. Considered in detail is also the ontology of terms, which came out to be a hard terrain for the deployment of philosophical logical ideas.

3.6. Asparuhov, V. 2017, „On What There Isn't”. In: *Philosophical Alternatives*, issue 2-3, pp. 176-190, ISSN: 0861-7899.

Abstract:

The article is organized thus: 1) The starting premise is the polemic between Ogden and Wittgenstein as to the title of the future *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. It grows into the

question of the adequacy of the concept of 'philosophical logic' and through it, it refers to the legitimacy of the endeavour itself that bears this heading. 2) The text continues with elucidating a stable tradition in the Bulgarian humanities whose founder was Prof. Dobrin Spasov. It traces the belief that 'philosophical logic is not philosophically sterile' and is based primarily on Russell's theory of relations. In the sources of this tradition, although dimly, one could see the demarcation problem – the problem of the border between formal and philosophical logic, concealed behind the difference between the extensional and the intensional approach to relations. 3) The next move proposes, instead of synopticity and sweeping generalizations, an accent on the superposing, sudden and difficult to grasp kairologies of the philosophical-logical. The claim here is of retaining the microscopic detail, of registering the diffusions in the logical field, in order to rethink a specific logical tradition as well as the borders between two or more traditions. 4) The article ends with a referral to the so-called logical data as the source of accumulation of logical empirics. On that, the idea is formed of what the philosopher has to do in logic. The conclusion is that this idea is empirical, it is the result of observation and not a product of the mind.

3.7. Asparuhov, V. 2017, „Thermonuclear and Other Syntheses“. In: *Καιρός*, E-Journal, issue 2, pp. 61-69, ISSN: 2534-8442;

Abstract:

Based on the exciting story of how Russell's archive went to McMaster University, the article seeks to outline and reassess the perimeter not simply of the texts inherited from Russell but of his thought's potential in leading to new philosophical depths. The intention is to overcome the entrenched historical-philosophical clichés that reduce Russell's achievement only to his complicity in 'the first serious advance in real logic since the time of the Greeks' (*Our Knowledge of the External World*, 1914), an advance also expressed in the expectation by which *Principles of Mathematics* (1903) begin: to discover the fundamental entities – the undefinables of philosophical logic – to which the propositions that we use should be able to be decomposed. Undefinables are cognizable – Russell is convinced of it – through acquaintance, i.e. in an immediately sensory way or by intellectual intuition, but

not through epistemic forms of transcendentalist genesis. By unfolding precisely this kind of genesis, this interpretation is trying to see as especially valuable the Russell that was surmounted by analytical tradition. And, instead of the failure of his epochal endeavour (as seen from the perspectives of the 'late' Wittgenstein, the philosophy of ordinary language or neopragmatism), it seeks to rediscover the fundamentals of logical atomism as an attempt for commensuring with e.g. *Critique of Pure Reason* or as inspiring the 'methodological situation' called 'the praxeological turn in logic' (Petkov, 'Russell, philosophical logic and relations', 2010).

In short, Russell – maybe without being aware of it – has left transcendental traces in which this text claims to find an orientation. The traces remain not simply because of his idealist past but despite that past and in spite of the attempts to forget it. They are extracted from logical experience, from the philosophical, including logical, data – a term corresponding to Russell's important discoveries but also to what we could discover through Russell, standing on and going beyond the detailed discussions bequeathed by him. The data are, in practice, what he reaches and analyzes. It is through this material and its interpretation that we can grasp the specific transcendentalism, quite different from Russell's Kantian heritage, which returns on him as an unrecognized transcendental impulse. Its expression is the frequent use of a dozen linguistic figures like 'can occur as', 'can be made into', 'must participate as', 'all possible ways in which an entity can enter into a complex', expressions in which Russell tries to think and speak of things for which there was no place under the logical sun (such as the properties of logical form, or the actually forming form, i.e. form as 'shown' rather than 'said', to use Wittgenstein's idiolect). Those linguistic figures also conceal a transcendental ground that leads back to logical forms that are pre-inserted into things (into terms that have their natural asymmetry) and through them, to the propositions of the *Tractatus*: 'The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object' (2.0141). Thus, more than a decade before the formulation, in the *Tractatus*, of the fundamental distinction between 'said' and 'shown', it was anticipated in Russell's thought experiments. In this sense the claim, and possibly the provocation, of this text is to suggest that there is a possible way to seek for transcendental traces, not as remnants of the idealist past from which Russell wants to escape but as traces in the data themselves that he reaches. They reveal a specific transcendentalism based on the assumption that there is no autonomy of

the transcendental subject. This is essentially an anti-Copernican revolution towards an *als ob* transcendentalism whose outlines are set in the following questions: 'how is the transcendental subject formed' (of course, this question was worrying Heidegger and is directly related to the turn caused by his reading of Kant, i.e. with the emphasis on the transcendental capacity of imagination); 'how is a subject constituted that is only apparently constituting'.

3.8. Asparuhov, V. 2018, „Meinong in the Light of Russell’s Philosophical Logic“. In: *Language & Publicity*, E-Journal, NBU (in print).

Abstract:

The starting point of the text is the belief that the marginalized figures in the history of philosophy have a chance of rehabilitation only if researchers penetrate the deep layers of their doctrines. The Austrian philosopher and logician Alexius von Meinong is a bright example of the force of this belief. The article is based on the famous Meinong–Russell debate and the varying narratives in favour of the one or of the participant in the debate. The important starting question regards the influence of the ontological assumptions of Meinong in relation to the problematic of philosophical logic as proposed by Russell in 1903 and elaborated in 1913-1914. An important space is dedicated to Meinong’s studies on the status of relations. They lead him to the conclusion that relations are, similarly to everything else in his ontological inventory, particulars that are fundamentally dependent on, but not reducible to, their founding ideas (notions) just as a sensorily graspable complex as the melody is logically dependent on its *fundamenta* or on the ideas of the individual tones.

3.9. Asparuhov, V. 2018, „Logical Experience, Logical Imagination, Indefinable Concepts“. In: *Καίρός*, E-Journal, issue 3, pp. 128-136, ISSN: 2534-8442;

Abstract:

The article is organized as follows: (1) „experience“, „faculty of imagination“ and „concept“ which are essential part from Kantian transcendental analytics are separated and considered; (2) the goal is for these concepts to be grasped not as founding the principles of knowledge of understanding but through the question of what is heterogeneous in their nature; (3) in this relation, non-reason elements in the content of these concepts acquire a key importance; (4) it is demonstrated how, modified to some extent, these concepts are used in the context of early analytic philosophy; (5) moreover, „logical experience“, „logical imagination“ and „indefinable“ will come out as related in a philosophical-logical constellation that is visible in Russell’s epistemological *Manuscript* of 1913 and *Our knowledge of the External World*; (6) an attempt is made of interpretation (analysis) of the concept of „experience“, defined as „acquaintance with the logical form“, i.e. as „mental synthesis“ which is its implicit primary ingredient.

3.10. Asparuhov, V. 2019, „Kant or Cant(or)“. In: *Philosophy*, issue 3, ISSN 0861-6302 (in print);

Abstract:

The article aims to overcome the traditional standards in connection with the interpretation of Russell’s philosophical logic. The requirement which is needed for that aim to be done, is the re-evaluation of a series of features in the British philosopher’s mode of thinking. The text is organized as it follows: 1) A mixture of some autobiographical storylines, which suggest the negative attitude of Russell to the tradition of transcendentalism; 2) Analysis of some selected sections from Russell’s unpublished manuscript from 1903/1904, which is rarely mentioned, too. In the context of the same manuscript some indicators are visible and they show that in his mental experiments transcendental counterparts of important logical puzzles exist; 3) It is maintained that the problems of philosophical logic and non-classical transcendentalism could be studied together relying on *Critique of Pure Reason*.

3.11. Asparuhov, V. 2019, „The Perception of Logical Objects (Russell and Kant)“. In: *Καιρός*, E-Journal, issue 4, pp. 9-15, ISSN: 2534-8442;

Abstract:

The starting interest of the article is oriented on the problem of *a priori* synthesis and its initial and paradigmatic raising in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Its completing and strengthening interpretations of the early 20th century, especially those deployed in the context of the Davos debate, will not be discussed. Although some of their propositions are used and despite their doubtless originality and depth, they have no direct impact on the clarification of the link between *a priori* syntheses and the perception of logical primitives. The statement that ‘there can be no truths in themselves or eternal truth, and as far as truth exist at all, they are correlative to *Dasein*’ transforms the problem of *a priori* synthesis thus: since for the subjectivity that cognizes in experience, which is finite, no eternal and necessary truths are possible, then how it is possible, under the conditions of this finitude, there to be necessary and universal truths? How are such synthetic *a priori* propositions possible that are, on the plane of content, universal and necessary? Passing through Kant and the question that he raised on the foundations of the cognitive link – how is knowledge possible, or what are the conditions of possibility of the cognitive synthesis – I will go to Russell to discuss the character of perception of logical objects. Aware of the arbitrariness of some of my analogies, I will try to justify the assumption that the British philosopher couldn’t overcome the shadow of his Kantian past.

III. CONTRIBUTIONS

The materials selected for participation in the competition procedure reveal a multi-layer systematic exploration – at places, exposed in a deliberately essay-like stylistic – on the theoretical status of philosophical logic in the late 19th and early 20th century. They proceed, on the one hand, by tracing its chronological development in the early works of Russell, and on the other hand, by analyzing his declared basic theoretical tenets that delineate its

perimeter. These tenets draw the border between philosophical logic and logicism but they could also be perceived as the intention to involve into a productive polemics with traditions different from analytic philosophy. A series of analyses is deployed of texts whose authors write in the context of the analytic tradition but also somewhat deviate from its mainstream. A particular merit of the project in its entirety is that it reevaluates the usual English-language philosophy attitudes toward Russell's logic and with regard to his influence on the development of analytic philosophy in the 20th c. An essential feature here is the ontological reading of Russell's philosophical logic. It is completed with the assumption of his epistemology, too, ontologically funded, whence some difficulties come before the radical individuation of an autonomous philosophical-logical field.

Although controversial, especially to the orthodox adherents of the method of logical analysis, the contribution with regard to the transcendentalization of method is doubtless. It consists in putting under question the very conditions of possibility of analysis, to reach the conclusion that as regards Russell's analytic practice, this method is far from being only one. Since they are many, albeit not precisely differentiated, the more acceptable strategy on which the study stakes is to put to analysis the practicing itself of analysis instead of what has been said on and in relation to it. This gives the opportunity to overcome the opposition between formal and material analysis which is traditionally expected to reveal logical forms. Transcending this opposition is the condition of perceiving a multidimensional and unpre-given logical form.

As an achievement of the project, one should also singe out the proposal to think Russell as a transcendental logician. Of course, it is claimed nowhere that he is indeed one, it is only permitted to think him as one, suggesting that the difficulties before his philosophical logic are surmountable through the inspired by him, although never acknowledged, transcendental logic.

A tangible advantage of the study is the emphasis on 'transcendental traces' in the mental experiments of Russell which anything but remnants from his Kantian past. The traces indicate that the difficulties before his formal logic have their 'transcendental doubles'. Unexpectedly to himself, they largely lead him to rediscovering and redrawing the misty territory of philosophical logic, in being aware that all of its problems come out to be, without residue, transcendental. They are discoverable through the technique of

morphological *epoché* and are reducible, in the final account, to the questions of a priori synthetic propositions and the formation of the transcendental subject.

The claim is also important that if we can think of a Russelian transcendentalism (which returns to the already abandoned Kant to extract the hidden non-classicality from him) in logic, then it is quite obviously nonclassical, since it abandons the presumption of an active transcendental subject and is interested in the 'real conditions of possibility' for propositions, logical forms and inferences. It is in the context of the mentioned 'abandon' and 'interest' that one should position Russell's problematization of 'logical imagination'. Although not meticulously analyzed, the conjecture is that it has key functions – mostly in relation to the discovery of logical primitives – and adds unexpected accents to his philosophical logic. On the other hand, 'philosophical imagination', as far as it participates and complements 'logical experience', points to an indeterminate appetite for formation (but in the absence of an active transcendental subject), an expression of the willful side of what is cognized, of its will to form.

Essentially, this claim redraws the trajectory of a nonclassical transcendental logic, never deployed to the full, which could function as an organon to certain parts of human knowledge. It must work together with, but also at a healthy distance from, the well-equipped technically formal logic, i.e. to maintain the critical resistance against the latter's claims to uniqueness and success. The other bold anticipation that generates the nonclassical transcendental logic is related to has been called, for over two decades, the praxeological turn in the understanding of the logical – a productive experiment whose results, I believe, will be exciting in the future,